Using the firm-level data over 1989-2012 from 53 countries, we find religiosity in a country is positively associated with trade credit use by local firms. Specifically, after controlling for firm-and country-level factors as well as industry and year effects, we show that trade credit use is higher in more religious countries. Moreover, both creditor rights and social trust in a country enhance the positive association between religiosity and trade credit use, while the quality of national-level disclosure mitigates the aforementioned positive association. These results are robust to alternative measures of religiosity, alternative sampling requirements, and potential endogeneity concerns. JEL Classification: G32; M410; Z12
Introduction
Trade credit arises when suppliers deliver goods to customers who do not pay immediately but promise to pay later. It is an important type of informal financing offered by suppliers to their customers and is usually a part of the commercial condition of a sale (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Fisman and Love, 2003) . Typically, there is no collateral standing behind the transaction and no guarantees from third parties or financial intermediaries.
Trade credit is generally non-interest bearing, which is important for certain religions (e.g., Islam) that prohibit dealing with interest.
1 Like suppliers of institutional finance (e.g., banks), suppliers of trade credit face the future default risk of customers. As such, human belief is crucial in the decisions of granting and receiving trade credit.
In this study, we investigate whether religiosity explains cross-country variation in trade credit use. Religiosity refers to "customary beliefs and values" transmitted by religious groups from generation to generation (Guiso et al., 2006) . Prior literature shows that religiosity influences economic outcomes through its impact on individuals' values and beliefs (Barro and McCleary, 2003; McCleary and Barro, 2006) . Given that religiosity is a major source of morality and ethical behavior (e.g., Grullon et al., 2010; Callen and Fang, 2015) , we argue that religiosity constrains the opportunistic and default-prone behaviors of customers, which provides suppliers with higher incentives to supply trade credit. Additionally, prior literature documents that religiosity is positively associated with risk aversion behaviors (e.g., Hilary and Hui, 2009 ). As such, due to the presence of information asymmetry regarding the product quality, risk-averse customers tend to 2 demand trade credit as an implicit assurance of product quality. Thus, we posit that religiosity in a country shapes the extent of trade credit use in that country.
We adopt the cross-country setting since such a setting provides more variation in religiosity across countries. Specifically, we use a sample of 248,824 firm-year observations over a maximum period of 1989-2012 from 53 countries and control for firm-and country-level factors as well as industry and year effects. We find that firms located in more religious countries tend to use more trade credit. Moreover, we find that stronger creditor rights in a country, as well as higher social trust in the country, enhance the positive association between religiosity and trade credit use,
while better disclosure quality in a country mitigates the aforementioned positive association.
To mitigate the endogeneity concerns that our results may fail to control for institutional factors that determine both religiosity and trade credit use, we instrumentalize our religiosity measures with a country's shares of adherents to different religions in each country. The effect of religiosity on trade credit use continues to hold in the two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regression.
We further adopt an exogenous shock setting in a subsample analysis and obtain consistent results.
Moreover, to distinguish firm-level from country-level effects, we conduct country-level regressions and find similar results. Finally, the results hold after we employ alternative measures of religiosity or after we make alternative sampling requirements.
Our paper contributes to several streams of research. First, our paper provides new evidence on the importance of religiosity in explaining economic decisions and outcomes, thus supporting the related work of Stulz and Williamson (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006) .
Specifically, our paper documents a new factor determining firms' trade credit policies in a crosscountry setting. Using the firm-level data, we contribute to this stream of literature by showing that national religiosity, as an extra-legal country-level institution, is crucial in shaping trade credit 3 use in our sample countries. The effect of religiosity on trade credit use is over and above that of the previously documented country-and firm-level determinants of trade credit use.
Second, our study complements the literature on the mechanisms that facilitate firms to access financing. Extra-legal institutions, such as social norms, culture, and governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationships, enable firms to overcome institutional barriers to various sources of funding, including informal financing such as trade credit (e.g., Fisman and Love, 2003; Cull et al., 2009; El Ghoul and Zheng, 2016) . Our study shows that religiosity, as another extra-legal institution, fosters the prevalence of trade credit for firms that likely face restrictions in formal financing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our main hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data and variables. Section 4 presents the descriptive statistics and the main empirical analysis. Section 5 reports the results of the robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
Hypotheses Development

Effect of national religiosity on firms' trade credit use
Trade credit is a short-term informal financing instrument used by suppliers and their customers. In this section, we argue that religiosity prompts suppliers to offer more trade credits to customers, and further, religiosity allows customers to pay off trade credits in a timely manner.
Recent literature links religious adherence to lower risk-taking (e.g., Hilary and Hui, 2009; McGuire et al., 2012; Noussair et al., 2013) . For example, Bartke and Schwarze (2008) show that religious people in Germany are less risk-tolerant than atheists. Using a sample of religious people from the Netherlands, Noussair et al. (2013) provide confirmatory evidence that religious people, 4 as measured by church membership or attendance, are risk-averse. Similarly, Hilary and Hui (2009) find that firms located in counties with higher levels of religiosity display lower degrees of risk exposure (as measured by variances in equity returns or in return on assets). The above studies suggest that customers from more religious countries demand more assurance of product quality when facing information asymmetry at the time of purchase. The risk-aversion tendency of customers motivates suppliers to offer more trade credits to provide implicit warranties on their products (Smith, 1987; Lee and Stowe, 1993; Long et al., 1993) .
However, suppliers offering trade credits face the future default risk of customers. Unlike banks, suppliers typically have a relatively small number of customers and cannot easily diversify their risks. Furthermore, information asymmetry between suppliers and customers would potentially accentuate the default risk of customers (Aktas et al., 2012) . When customers cannot pay their payables within the normal credit period, the payables become overdue. The subsequent default resulting from overdue payables indicates a violation of contract, in which ethical customers are less likely to engage. As a result, suppliers count on the ethics and honesty of their customers when offering trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Guiso et al., 2004) . In this regard, prior literature has confirmed that religiosity is a major source of morality and ethical behavior (see Vitell (2009) for a review of empirical literature). According to McGuire et al. (2012) , when religion is central to a person's self-identity, ethically questionable behaviors generate higher levels of cognitive and emotional discomfort, which motivates religious adherents to align their behavior with role expectations. Hence, customers who receive trade credit in a more religious country are more likely to pay their payables in a timely manner. Moreover, from the social norm perspective, religiosity, which serves as a form of social norm, constrains the opportunistic behaviors of customers who obtain trade credit. Stavrova and Siegers (2014) argue that people 5 who behave in accordance with social norms may receive higher levels of social recognition and respect. Therefore, customers in a more religious country would be less likely to default on their trade credits because violating social norms would receive less social respect or additional social sanctions.
To summarize, customers in more religious countries have a stronger demand for trade credit given their risk aversion behaviors. Correspondingly, suppliers are more likely to supply trade credit to customers because religiosity constrains customers' defaulting tendency on accounts payables. Based on the above discussions, we hypothesize the following:
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms from more religious countries use more trade credit in transactions than firms from less religious countries.
We acknowledge that the opposite prediction is also likely. 2 Since supplier firms are also risk-averse, they are reluctant to offer trade credit to customers due to concerns about default risk.
It is also possible that customers do not demand extensive trade credit as they are relatively confident that any product defaults can be dealt with swiftly by the suppliers in highly religious countries. Therefore, this prediction implies that trade credit is low in more religious countries due to trust about product quality. We retain the directional hypothesis above, and we explicitly test the role of trust in the subsequent section.
Moderating roles of institutional factors across countries
The legal, political, social, and cultural environments of a country influence a firm's choice to demand cash payment upon delivery or to sell on credit (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009 ). We consider the following three country-level institutional factors.
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First, the quality of information disclosure affects trade credit use (Dai and Yang, 2015) . Countries with stringent disclosure requirements provide an information level playing field for all parties.
When there is less information asymmetry between suppliers and customers (Smith, 1987; Aktas et al., 2012) , risk-averse customers do not demand as much trade credit as long as they can better assess the product quality. As such, religiosity will play a less significant role in explaining trade credit use. 3 Second, strong creditor rights in a country protect lenders from appropriations by borrowers. Furthermore, creditor rights are related to the power of secured lenders in the bankruptcy process granted by the laws and regulations of a country. Stiglitz (1999) 1981 and 2008 , including 1981 -84, 1990 -93, 1995 -97, 1999 -2004 , and 2005 -2008 (Díez-Medrano, 2009 (2001), we use the other variable, ARTurnover, which is defined as the ratio of total sales over accounts receivable.
Empirical models
Our multivariate OLS regression model testing the effect of religiosity on trade credit use is specified as follows:
, , In addition to our variable of interest, we also control for factors that prior research (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Aktas et al., 2012) suggests are associated with trade credit use.
Specifically, we control for firm size (Size), which is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets.
Larger firms have better management of their cash conversion cycle when compared with smaller firms, and they also have better access to financial markets. Therefore, larger firms can demand less but extend more trade credit to customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Atanasova, 2007) . We also control for several operating performance measures, including return on assets (ROA), the ratio of net sales over net fixed assets (NSNFA), sales growth rate (SalesGrowth). Inventory 10 management is an important factor to influence trade credit. To reach an optimal inventory level and avoid the buildup of inventory, firms with cost advantages in financing receivables may find it optimal to extend additional credit to customers (Emery, 1987) . Thus, we control for inventory turnover (InvTurnover). The decision to offer trade credit can also be motivated by product market competition. Thus, we control for industry-specific Herfindahl index based on firm sales (HHI).
Moreover, over-levered or distressed firms tend to be financially constrained, thereby causing these firms to reduce investment in net trade credit by collecting accounts receivables, tightening credit terms, or stretching credit terms granted by suppliers (Molina and Preve, 2009). We therefore control for financial leverage (Lev), defined as the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities over total assets, and the cash ratio (Cash), defined as the ratio of cash and short-term investments over total assets. Finally, we include the variable AP, measured as the ratio of accounts payable to total liabilities. (2008), we include the development of private credit (PrivCredit), defined as the ratio of private credit to gross domestic product, where both values are at the country level. We also include the natural logarithm of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (LnGDP), as well as the growth rate of the real GDP per capita (GDPGrowth). Moreover, we control for an inflation rate of the GDP deflator (Inflation), and country-level openness (Openness), which is defined as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports over GDP. All these annual data are obtained from the World Development Indicators.
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The pooled OLS model includes industry and country fixed effects to account for heterogeneity in trade credit across industries and countries. We also include year fixed effects to control for macroeconomic effects. In addition, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the country and year levels (Petersen, 2009).
To examine the moderating effect of institutional factors across countries, we use the following three variables: Disclosure, CreditorRights, and Trust. To examine the impact of country-level disclosure quality on the relationship between religiosity and trade credit use (H2a),
We use the variable Disclosure, which is the index of accounting disclosure quality based on aggregate annual financial statement disclosure scores from the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR, 1995) . We expect a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term Disclosure × Religiosity as predicted by H2a.
To test H2b, we introduce the variable CreditorRights, which measures the aggregate creditor rights for each country (Djankov et al., 2007) . 6 We expect no significant loading on the interaction term CreditorRights × Religiosity.
To test H2c, we add the variable Trust, which measures the extent of social trust in a country (Pevzner et al., 2015) . According to H2c, we expect no significant loading on the interaction term Trust × Religiosity. Table I shows that on average approximately 52% of the population in each sample country are affiliated with religions; 81% report that religion is important in their daily life; and 10% attend religious services on a monthly basis. Based on the composite measure of religiosity (Religiosity), Nigeria, Morocco, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Egypt are the most religious countries, while China, Japan, Estonia, Sweden and Germany are the least religious countries in our sample. For the full sample, the average fraction of accounts receivable on total assets is 20%. Mean values of accounts receivables as a percentage of total assets vary widely across countries, from 6% in Saudi Arabia to 37% in Morocco. Pakistan (Morocco) also holds the highest (the lowest) accounts receivable turnover ratios.
Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics of the variables
The country-level statistics in Table I further indicate unequal economic development across the sample. While Qatar has the highest GDP per capita (LnGDP = 11.26) as well as the fastest GDP growth, India is the poorest country in terms of GDP per capita (LnGDP = 6.72).
Hong Kong's ratio of total import and export to its GDP (Openness = 4.06) is nearly 17 times of Japan and United States (Openness = 0.24). We also notice that the group of five most religious countries and the other group of five least religious countries exhibit certain distinct institutional factors. For example, the most religious countries have lower ratios of private credit to their economies (average PrivCredit = 0.508 vs. 1.046 for the least religious countries). Those most religious countries have stronger creditor rights protection (average CreditorRights = 2.2) compared to an average of 1.6 for the five least religious countries. However, we do not see a significant difference between the most religious countries and the least religious ones in terms of disclosure quality and social trust. Religiosity is negatively correlated with a country's protection of creditor rights but positively correlated with a country's disclosure quality.
Multivariate regressions results
Table IV reports the coefficient estimates of regressing the trade credit proxies (ARTurnover and AR) on the composite religiosity measure, after controlling for various firm-and country-level characteristics. Models (1) and (2) present the multivariate results when accounts receivable turnover (ARTurnover) is the dependent variable while Models (3) and (4) use AR as the dependent variable. In Model (1), we find a significantly negative association between
Religiosity and ARTurnover at the 10% level. The result supports that firms in more religious countries extend more trade credit to customers. In Model (2), we also find a significantly negative relation between Religiosity and ARTurnover at the 1% level, after controlling for the additional country-level and firm-level variables. Models (3) and (4) Finally, across both panels, our previous findings on the relationship between religiosity and trade credit use remain unchanged, reducing concerns that our results are driven by the omission of country-level institutional factors. Table IV . Specifically, the coefficients on the fitted religiosity measure bear significant and expected signs in both specifications. Overall, the results confirm that our model linking trade credit proxies and religiosity is robust to the issue of omitted explanatory variables.
Sensitivity Tests and Results
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Separately, we consider an exogenous shock setting related to the fall of the Iron Curtain and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, after which many of the Central Table IV .
Results from country-level regressions
In Table VII , we report the country-level regression results that test the relation between religiosity and trade credit use. The country-level regression utilizes aggregate values of firmspecific data in each country. Moreover, to proxy for the amount of domestic trade in a country, we multiply the aggregate accounts receivable by a local-trade weight, expressed as (1-exports to GDP ratio). Similarly, we multiply the aggregate sales by the local-trade weight. 9 The results in Table VII remain substantially the same as the main results in Table IV .
Results of subsample analyses
To test the sensitivity of our results, we repeat the main regressions on various subsamples. Table IV since the coefficients on Religiosity remain significant and consistent with predicted signs. In Table VIII , Panel B, we divide the sample based on whether a country has been surveyed only once or multiple times. As shown in Panel B, the religiosity data for most countries are time-variant. Again, we obtain consistent results from these subsample analyses.
Results using alternative religiosity measures
We test the robustness of our results to alternative measures of religiosity. In Table IX Hindu religions are willing to use trade credit. 10 Overall, these results again confirm the effect of religiosity on trade credit use, although there appear to be significant differences across religions.
Conclusion
Adopting country-and firm-level data from 53 countries, we find that national religiosity is an important driver for the cross-country variations of trade credit use. Specifically, after controlling for firm-and country-level factors as well as industry and year effects, we show that trade credit use is higher in more religious countries. Moreover, both creditor rights and social trust in a country enhance the positive association between religiosity and trade credit use, while national-level disclosure quality mitigates the aforementioned positive association. These results are robust to alternative measures of religiosity and trade credit use, and potential endogeneity concerns. Overall, our study shows that religiosity, as another extra-legal institution, fosters the prevalence of trade credit for firms that likely face restrictions in formal financing. It is important to note that the effect of religiosity on trade credit use is over and above that of the previously documented country-and firm-level determinants of trade credit use. 
Appendix: Variable Definitions
CreditorRights
Creditor rights index, which ranges from 0 to 4 and aggregates creditor rights in the following way: (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors can gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Missing values are supplemented with the sample mean.
Djankov et al. (2007)
Disclosure Index of accounting disclosure quality, which is based on aggregate annual financial statement disclosure scores from the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR, 1995) . Five aspects of corporate reporting are considered: (1) financial disclosure intensity, (2) governance disclosure intensity, (3) accounting principles used to measure financial disclosures, (4) timeliness of financial disclosures, and (5) audit quality of financial disclosures. The index ranges between 0 (lowest disclosure) to 1 (highest disclosure). Missing values are supplemented with the sample mean.
CIFAR ( (1) and (2) use AR as the dependent variables, and Columns (3) and (4) use ARTurnover as the dependent variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values based on robust t-statistics with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at country and year levels are reported in the parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (3) report the results of the 2 nd stage regression using ARTurnover and AR as the dependent variables, respectively. Panel B reports the regression results based on a country-specific exogenous shock setting. All variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values based on robust t-statistics with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at country and year levels are reported in the parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
